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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARL N. SMITH and, ; 
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs . 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
) Case No. 880661-CA 
) Priority 14b 
JURISDICTION 
This Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear thxb 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3{2)(j), (Supp. 
1988) which permits appeals transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Judgment of the District Court 
of Duchesne County, Honorable Dennis L. Draney presiding, 
determining the nature and amount of damages awarded to 
plaintiffs based on defendants placement of an oil well, battery, 
storage tank and road on plaintiffs' property pursuant to an oil 
and gas lease. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that defendants 
choice of the well site was reasonable and practical and that the 
dealings of defendant with plaintiff were carried out in good 
faith? 
2. Did the trial court properly determine the nature and 
amount of damages awarded to plaintiffs based on defendants 
placement of a well site and road on defendants property? 
3. Did the trial court properly determine not to allow 
plaintiff prejudgment interest? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no constitution provisions, statutes or rules 
which govern this case* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the fall of 1984, plaintiffs filed an action in the 
District Court of Duchesne County seeking damages against 
defendant for entering upon plaintiffs' property and constructed 
a well site and access road. The case was tried without a jury 
before the Honorable Dennis L. Draney on April 5 and 6, 1988. 
After submission of written post-trial memorandums, the 
court issued its Ruling dated June 8, 1988, awarding plaintiffs 
damages of $16,065.00. In making this determination, the Court 
determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to damages on their 
theory of eminent domain, but were entitled to be compensated for 
damage to crops on the property used by defendant. The Court 
determined defendant's use of the 4.76 acre parcel in question 
was of such nature and duration that it was rendered unusable for 
agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future. The Court ruled 
the extent of damage to crops constituted virtually a total 
taking of the property used by defendant and to allow plaintiffs 
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only the minimal value of the crops grown for an unknown number 
of years would not be equitable. The value of such taking was 
determined by the Court to be the fair market value of the 
property after deducting the residual value to the landowner 
after defendant's use of the property is terminated and the 
property is restored. In this regard, the Court arrived ai a 
property value of $3,750.00 per acre with an offset of $375.00 
per acre for its residual value. 
The Court declined to allow plaintiffs damages based on a 
fair market value of the subject property for residential 
purposes, declined to award plainriffs severance damages, and 
determined that defendant's choice of the well site was 
"reasonable and practical" and that defendant acted in "good 
faith". 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiffs are the owners of a 20 acre tract of land located 
adjacent to the city limits of Altamont in Duchesne County, which 
property is described as follows: 
The East 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 
of Section 25, Township 1 South, Range 4 West, USM. 
Plaintiffs' property is located in the Altamont-Bluebell 
oil field and is surrounded by numerous oil wells, six cf 
which can be seen from plaintiffs' property (R. at 608-510, 712-
715) . 
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Defendant is the successor lessee under an Oil and Gas Lease 
covering the subject property which is dated March 29, 1966, and 
was duly recorded in rhe office of the Duchesne County Recorder 
(R. at 611-612). 
During the month of August, 1983, defendant entered upon 
plaintiffs' 20 acre tract and placed in the southwest corner an 
oil well, oil well battery and storage tanks. An access road 
from the county road on the north to the well site was also 
constructed. Defendant's total occupancy consisted of 4.76 acres 
vhich is hereinafter referred to as the "Well Site" (R. at 198-
201) . 
Plaintiffs' 20 acre tract, including the well site, has been 
used exclusively for agricultural purposes. At the time of 
defendant's entry, the property was leased to Ken Miller for 
$450.00 per year. This lease continued through the date of trial 
at the same $450.00 per year lease price without offset due to 
defendant's use of the well site (R. 632-634). 
Defendant was restricted as to where it could locate its 
well site because of spacing restrictions of the Utah Division of 
Cil, Gas and Mining (R.at 181). Defendant considered several 
other locations for the drill site but rejected the other sites 
based on geological and economic factors (R. at 191). The school 
property was rejected because a pond is located on the same; the 
property is wet and the access road would have to be constructed 
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on swampy ground (R. at 184, 185 & 189). The Wall property was 
rejected because defendant did not want to deal with two property 
owners and the property was wet which would result in higher 
construction costs (R. at 186-187, 193). The Taylor site was 
rejected because it was too far east geologically to achieve 
defendant's objectives (R. at 289). 
Prior to construction of the well site defendant's agent, 
Edward Whicker, contacted plaintiff Carl Smith and met him on the 
subject property (R. at 227). As set forth in the following 
testimony by Mr. Whicker, Carl Smith refused to provide any input 
regarding where he would like the well drilled or the road 
constructed: 
Q .... You didn't say, how will this affect your use cf 
the surface, Mr. Smith, did you? 
A Yes. I asked him that. 
Q Oh, did you? 
A Yes. 
Q And did he say where he would have preferred to have it? 
A Yes. He said he didn't want it on his property at ail, 
Q Didn't he also tell you if you were going to do it he 
would rather you put it to the east rather than to the west 
side? 
A I don't have any record of that or any recollection of 
it. I asked him for an opinion as to where he would like 
it, and he said he would not make a decision. 
Q He said he wouldn't tell you where to put it? 
A I asked him if he would — he talked about subdividing, 
and I asked him if he would like a road put somewhere else 
so it would enhance his subdivision. 
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Q And you tell me -- he said he wouldn't give you an answer 
to either of those questions? 
A That's right. (R. at 192, 193). 
Defendant contracted the size of the well site in 1985 after 
the well was drilled and re-located the fence back to the west 
reducing the drill site by 1.39 acres (R. at 629). The lessee of 
the subject property, Ken Miller, was hired to restore the 1.39 
acres by fertilizing and replanting at defendant's expense (R. at 
643-644, 709-710). The Court determined that despite good-fairh 
efforts by defendant, the 1.39 acre tract was not restored and 
plaintiffs damages with respect thereto continued (R.151). 
Royalty payments have been made to plaintiffs and other 
mineral owners in Section 25 resulting from the well drilled on 
plaintiffs' property as well as from a well drilled on adjacent: 
lands (R. at 255, 628, 652-653). 
Plaintiff Carl Smith testified that he wanted to subdivide 
the subject property. However, Mr. Smith did not know whether 
the property was located in Duchesne County or Altamont City and 
was unaware of the subdivision requirements for either entity, 
In addition, Mr. Smith had never obtained estimates of the costs 
of subdividing the property (R. at 636). Further, Duchesne 
County had placed a moratorium on subdivisions at the time 
defendant moved onto the well site (R. at 636-637). 
Defendant's use of the property is not perpetual. Ed 
Whicker testified that in his opinion the well would be plugged 
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and the ground restored to its original condition in 1996 (R. at 
242-243, 275). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Plaintiffs' property is subject to an Oil and Gas Lease 
giving defendant the right to enter on plaintiffs' property to 
construct a well site for production of oil and gas. After a 
review of the potential sites, it was determined that for 
geological and economic reasons the site selected on plaintiffs' 
property was the optimum site. 
Defendant's representative, Edward Wicker, met with 
plaintiff Carl Smith to explain why the well site was selectsd in 
the proposed location and to receive information from Mr. Smith 
relative to placement of the well site and access road. Mr. 
Smith's only position was that he did not want the well or road 
anywhere on his property and refused to discuss options involving 
his property. 
The Oil and Gas Lease provided that defendant shall pay "for 
damage caused by its operations to growing crops". The Court 
determined that to allow plaintiffs only the minimum value of the 
crcps grown on their property for a number of years which could 
not be determined with any degree of accuracy would not be 
equitable. The Court further determined that since this was not 
a fee title taking cf plaintiffs' property, damages on the theory 
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eminent domain are not proper either., The Court:'s decision 
taking a compromise position that plaintiffs are entitled to the 
fair market value of their property after deducting any residual 
value to the landowner after defendant's use ended and the 
property has been restored is fair and equitable under the 
circumstances. Not to allow the minimal amount of residual value 
awarded would totally disregard the testimony presented that 
defendant's use is limited in time. 
It would be improper for the Court to assess damages based 
on the fair market value of the property for residential purposes 
inasmuch asi (1) The property had been used exclusively for 
agricultural purposes; (2) There was not a fee simple taking of 
the subject property; (3) The highest and best use of the 
property was not for a subdivision since there was no mdrkec for 
a residential subdivision and a moratorium was in eftect 
precluding such use; (4) The comparables used by all experts to 
arrive at their opinions regarding values clearly do not justify 
plaintiffs' expert's valuation; and (5) Plaintiffs' expert was 
shown to be biased. 
It would be improper for the Court to allow severance damage 
inasmuch as this is not a condemnation case but a contract case. 
Further, there is no credible evidence establishing plaintiffs' 
property that was not utilized as the well site has been 
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diminished in value. The yearly rental of $450.00 per year on 
the entire parcel continued without offset from the time the well 
site was established. 
The Court properly declined to award prejudgment interest 
since plaintiffs' damages were not easily calculable and definite 
which are requirements for awarding pre-judgment interest under 
Utah lav:. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT'S 
CHOICE OF THE WELL SITE WAS REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL AND 
THAT THE DEALINGS OF DEFENDANT WITH PLAINTIFF WERE CARRIED 
OUT IN GOOD FAITH. 
It is undisputed that the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas Lease 
gave defendant the right to enter onto plaintiff's property and 
construct and maintain the well site and access road. Defendant: 
was restricted as to where it could locate the well site due to 
spacing restrictions of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
For geological reasons, defendant wanted to be as far southwest 
as possible. Mr. Edward Wicker and Bob Lewis flew over the 
location and chose a couple of potential sites. Based on 
geological, economic and construction factors, it was determined 
to locate the well on plaintiffs' property. 
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Plaintiffs claim that defendant failed to enter into any 
kind of reasonable negotiation as to the location of the well-
site or access road. Such a claim is completely without merit. 
It was Mr. Wicker who contacted plaintiff Carl Smith in order to 
work out a mutual acceptable location for the well site and 
access road and tu resolve the issue of compensation to 
plaintiffs. It was Mr. Smith who became upset and refused to 
discuss alternatives on plaintiffs' property although defendant 
had a contractual right to locate a well site thereon. Mr. Smith 
did not want the well site at any location on his property under 
any circumstances. All of his proposed alternative locations 
were on adjoining ground. As indicated by the testimony 
previously quoted in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Smith refused to 
discuss any options which involved placement of the well site and 
road on his property. Mr. Smith made no good faith effort 
whatsoever during the negotiations. In fact, Mr. Smith was so 
hostile to defendant's request, that Mr, Whicker asked him if he 
intended to try to keep defendant off the property by the use of 
a shotgun. 
Plaintiffs attempt to show "bad faith" in the negotiation 
process by the alleged "promise" of Mr. Whicker that unless his 
offer was accepted, the case would be drug out in court and 
plaintiffs would end up receiving less money. While Mr. Whicker 
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does not recall this conversation, such a statement would not be 
an unreasonable response and merely states the obvious. 
Counsel for plaintiffs next argues that defendant's decision 
not to use James Curtis as a witness regarding property valuation 
"shows as well a calculated effort on the part of defendant to 
fulfill the other half of Mr. Whicker's prophecy, and clearly 
demonstrates bad faith in a clear violation of lessee's duties". 
Defendant's decision not to use Mr. Curtis as a witness was based 
on his lack of qualifications to testify as an expert witness on 
property valuations. Mr. Curtis did not have any appraisal 
designations and had never testified in court regarding property 
valuations (R. at 300-301). When plaintiffs' counsel attempted 
to utilize Mr. Curtis as an expert witness regarding property 
values, the Court refused to accept such testimony. 
Plaintiffs rely on Flying Diamond Corporation vs. Rust, 551 
P.2d 519 (1976) to support their claim that defendant's choice of 
the well site was not reasonable and practical and defendant did 
not deal in good faith. In Flying Diamond, the property owner 
Rust requested that Flying Diamond build an access road in from 
the north which would minimize damage and not interfere with 
irrigation of Rust's lands. Flying Diamond refused and proceeded 
to construct the road coming in from the East. The trial court 
found that it was not necessary to build a road from the east, 
that it could have come in from the north as Rust requested, and 
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that the road as so constructed from the east prevented 
defendants from irrigating 15 acres of land that had previously 
been irrigated. The Utah Supreme Court held Flying Diamond 
liable for damage to said 15 acres because Flying Diamond had a 
"reasonable alternative" of coming in from the norch which v^ ould 
have allowed the 15 acres to remain under irrigation and would 
not have affected Flying Diamond's operation. 
It is undisputed that under Flying Diamond vs. Rust, a 
lessee can be liable for damage if it excessively uses or 
unreasonably uses the surface in its operations. However, in the 
case at bar there is no evidence of excessive or unreasonable 
use. The testimony from Ed Whicker, the petroleum engineer for 
Linmar, and Jerry Aired, a licensed surveyor, was that the size 
and location of the drill site and the road way were reasonable. 
Plaintiffs' only argument that defendant's use was unreasonable 
was that the well should have been located off plaintiffs' 
property and on someone else's land. The district court in 
Flying Diamond Corporation vs. Rust, addressed that issue in 
paragraph 3 of its memorandum decision (Exhibit 23) and ruled 
adversely to the position maintained by plaintiffs in this 
action. The district court held : 
Further, the Court holds that the possible alternative' 
rule should be applied under the facts of this case only 
as to a possible alternative en the premises, and not: 
where the possible alternative is tc locate the well site 
on another's land. 
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A lessee under an oil and gas lease may be liable for 
damages under two different theories: One is based on the damage 
provisions in the lease, and the second is based on a reasonable 
alternative or an excessive use of lessor's property. Frankfort 
Oil Company v. Abrams, 159 Colo. 535, 413 P.2d 190 (1966) which 
was cited in Flying Diamond provides an example of contractual 
liability under an oil and gas lease. In Frankfort the landowner 
had attempted to interfere with Frankfort's operation of drilling 
several wells on the property, and the landlord was eventually 
enjoined from such interference. The landlord counterclaimed 
seeking to recover damages of $14,500.00 for lands that Frankfort 
had used in its drilling operations and for depreciation to other 
lands which had not been used. Frankfort had not used an 
excessive amount of Abrams' property and there was no issue of a 
"reasonable alternative". The Colorado Court determined that 
Abrams was not entitled to damages for depreciation to lands not 
used by Frankfort. 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the holding of the 
Frankfort case, but properly distinguished the application of the 
Frankfort case from the facts established in Flying Diamond 
Corporation. The Utah Supreme Court said: 
We see no reason to disagree with the holding of the 
Frankfort case and others like it, which deny coverage 
for depreciation resulting to the landowner's other 
property by the exercise of the right to extract. But 
we do not see that this is inconsistent with the finding 
of the trial court and the judgment rendered herein.*** 
When viewed in that light, it is apparent that the trial 
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court found that because of the placement and manner of 
construction of the plaintiff's road, preventing 
irrigation of fifteen acres of the defendant's land, 
its usefulness and value were diminished to the extent 
of $750.00 per acre. 
The decision in Flying Diamond is consistent with the 
general law on this issue. In 38 Amc Jure 2nd, Gas and Oil, 
section 115, the law is summarized as follows: 
The lessee's right to the use of the surface may, under 
the proper circumstances, be such as to preclude any 
surface operations other than his own„ And the mere 
fact that the lessee could have conveniently placed 
his operating facilities elsewhere than he did does not 
entitle the surface owner to complain that the 
particular placement was unreasonable. 
By placing the well at the location it did, rather than at 
some other location off plaintiffs' property, defendant attempted 
to enhance the amount of oil and gas produced from the well, 
minimize the cost of the location and minimize the impact to the 
surface. By attempting to enhance the ultimate recovery of oil 
and gas, both parties benefit since they share proportionately in 
the oil and gas proceeds. The trial court properly determined 
that the choice of the well site was reasonable and practical and 
defendant negotiated with plaintiffs in good faith. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED 
TO PLAINTIFF BASED ON PLACEMENT OF AN OIL WELL, 
OIL WELL BATTERY, STORAGE TANKS AND ROAD ON DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
Defendant's position at trial regarding damages was that 
plaintiffs' recovery was limited to damage to growing crops on 
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the subject property pursuant to paragraph 8 of the March 29, 
1966 Oil and Gas Lease. Inasmuch as the 4.76 acres is 23.8 
percent of the 20 acre parcel, defendant argued that plaintiffs 
were entitled to 23.8 percent of the $450.00 yearly rental or 
$107.10 per year until such time as defendant moves the well site 
and restores the property. The Court rejected this position on 
the basis that the nature and duration of defendant's use of the 
property rendered it not useful for agricultural purposes in the 
foreseeable future and it would not be fair and eguitable to 
allow plaintiffs only the minimal value of the crops grown en 
that property. 
Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to damages under an 
eminent domain theory but have failed to cite to the court aiy 
precedent for their position. It is submitted that if 
condemnation v/as applicable, defendant would receive fee title to 
the subject property and would have been required to obtain an 
order of immediate occupancy to go onto the property. If the 
Flying Diamond case was premised on eminent domain law, the Court 
would have awarded interest at 8 percent which is the applicable 
rate for condemnation cases. 
The Courts have failed to apply the theory of eminent domain 
under similar fact situations. In O'Connor vs. Great Lakes 
Pipeline Company, 63 F.2d 523 (8th Circuit, 1933), the owner of 
480 acres of farmland sought to obtain damages in an amount of 
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$1,200.00 for the alleged depreciation of their entire parcel of 
land as a result of the operations carried on by Defendant 
pursuant to a pipeline easement. The claim was based upon a 
clause in the agreement which provided for the reimbursement for 
"...all damages to crops, surfaces, fences, and premises for and 
because of laying of each line of pipe." The trial court refused 
to submit the question to the jury regarding depreciation of the 
entire parcel. The trial court ruled that depreciation was net 
within the contemplation of the parties as an element of damages. 
The appellate court affirmed, after noting that the right to 
damages is governed by the written contract, not the law of 
condemnation. The Court held: 
The damage, if any, for which payment was to be made 
was provided by the contract. It was to crops, 
surfaces, fences, and premises, not by the granting of tne 
easement, but by the laying of each line of pipe.... 
Depreciation in the market value of the land was 
evidently not in the mind of either party or different 
language would have been used. The agreement no where 
refers to this. 
Plaintiff should not be allowed to receive the benefits of 
the lease, i.e., the royalty, and then claim that although tl.e 
ground is subject to a valid lease in favor of defendant, 
plaintiff is not bound by the terms of the lease as to damages. 
To allow plaintiff to recover damages under a theory of eminent 
domain would be improper and without precedent. 
Plaintiffs want to "have their cake and eat it too". 
Specifically, plaintiffs want to be paid the full fee title value 
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of the subject property now and then require defendant to turn 
the property back to them when the recoverable oil has been 
obtained. That is simply overreaching by plaintiffs, and is far 
beyond any damages provided for in the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas 
Lease. 
In paragraph 2 of the Court's Ruling, the Court stated: 
To allow plaintiffs only the minimal value of crops 
grown on that property for a number of years which 
cannot now be determined would not be equitable. 
In a similar manner, to allow plaintiffs the fair market 
value of a fee title interest in the 4.76 acre well site and then 
restore the same to them after the oil and gas have been removed 
would likewise not be fair and equitable. Under the 
circumstances, the courts compromised position if anything 
substantially favors plaintiffs and they have no cause to 
challenge the Court's decision. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY REFUSED TO ASSESS DAMAGES 
BASED ON THE ALLEGED HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPERTY FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES. 
Plaintiffs' expert, Richard Palmer, testified that the 
highest and best use of the subject property was for residential 
purposes. However, it is submitted that Mr. Palmer's opinion and 
his $4,200.00 per acre valuation is impeached on the following 
grounds: 
(a) Bias. Mr. Palmer was aware of Howard Carroll'G 
$2,000.00 per acre valuation and that said price was 
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not high enough for plaintiffs' purposes (Ro at 530). Mr-
Palmer was hired to provide a higher property valuation and 
plaintiff got what he paid for despite Mr. Palmer's 
statements to Lynn Snow that it would be hard to justify 
valuing the Smith parcel over $2,000.00 per acre (R. at 
689) . 
(b) Highest and Best USP Not for Subdivision. Mr. Peimer 
testified the highest and best use of tne subject property 
was for subdivision purposes. Such an opinion is in 
complete disregard of the following: 
(i) The property had always been used for 
agricultural purposes (R. at 552). 
(ii) Duchesne County had a moratorium for subdivision 
development at the time Linmar Energy started work on 
the property (R. at 5 33). 
(iii) Since the purpose of annexation is to 
annex completely adjacent parcels, annexation 
probably would not have occurred since the subject 
property was adjacent to Altamont in only one corner 
(R. at 539). 
(iv) There was no demand for subdivision lots in 
August, 1983. Mr. Palmer did not know how many 
subdivisions were in Altamont, the number of lots 
for sale in the Thacker subdivision, or how much 
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property was available for sale in the fall of 1983. 
He was further unaware of the drop in building 
activity as established by County records showing 
that home building permits dropped from 12 3 to 59 
and mobile home permits dropped from 100 to 78 from 
1982 to 1983 (R. at 546-549). 
(v) Mr. Palmer had not done any calculations to 
determine costs of installing road, sewer, water, 
gas, electricity, and telephone lines if a 
subdivision were developed. Further, he did noc 
consider architectural fees, legal fees, real 
estate commission fees, etc., in determining if a 
subdivision was feasible (R. at 554-559). 
(vi) Mr. Palmer admitted that highest and best use 
of property had to take into consideration "reasonable 
and probable" use (R. at 553). A subdivision on 
plaintiffs' property was neither reasonable nor 
probable, 
(c) Misuse of Comparable Sales. The Smith property 
constitutes a twenty acre parcel of ground. Not a single 
comparable located by Mr. Palmer involving a sale of 
over ten acres produced a price of $2,000.00 per acre. 
(R. at 565-566). The 13.5 acre parcel which is locatea in 
the same section sold for $1,850.00 per acre. Excluding the 
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one acre sale in a developed subdivision which sale is 
clearly distinguishable, the average per acre sale price of 
Mr, Palmer's comparables is $2,046.66 per acre. 
Mr. Palmer justifies his $4,200.00 value because 4.76 acre 
parcels are more valuable than 20 acre parcels. While this 
is true to a certain extent, at the time Linmar started 
construction there was no road to the 4.7 6 acre piece. 
Without access and the improved road, Mr. Smith would have 
been lucky to get $2,000.00 per acre for the 4.76 acre 
parcel. Plaintiff should not be able to profit in this 
action for the road constructed by Defendant at Defendant's 
expense. 
Using Mr. Palmer's logic and valuations, there are now three 
remaining five acre parcels on plaintiffs' property which 
are valued at $4,200.00 per acre. The three five-acre 
parcels thus have a total value of $63,000.00, whereas 
before the entire property was only worth $50,000.00. 
Therefore, plaintiffs have been rewarded rather than damaged 
using Mr. Palmer's logic. 
(d) Fee Simple Valuation. Mr. Palmer admitted his 
valuation is based on a fee simple valuation. Linmar Energy 
is restricted in its use of the subject property, cannot 
sell or transfer the same, and will eventually return 
complete ownership to plaintiff (R. ar 570). 
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(e) Water Right, Mr. Palmer's valuation included a full 
Indian right which Linmar Energy has no right or title to 
(R. at 580). 
(f) Inexperience in Duchesne County. Mr. Palmer's primary 
experience in appraisal is on the Wasatch Front and his 
appraisal experience in Duchesne County was limited to 
possibly one appraisal per year (R. at 529). 
Plaintiff Carl Smith's assertion that he wanted to develop 
the subject property was a poor attempt to maximize his damages 
from Defendante Mr. Smith was unaware whether his property was 
located in Duchesne County or Altamont City and was not aware of 
the subdivision requirements for either entity. Further, he was 
not aware that a moratorium was in effect in Duchesne County and 
had never obtained estimates of the cost of subdividing his 
property. 
Damages based on "highest and best use" is relevant to 
condemnation actions and is not applicable to the case at bar. 
Even if the court determined that a "highest and best use" 
valuation was proper, the highest and best use of the subject 
property is for agricultural purposes. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
Severance damages are also associated exclusively with 
condemnation cases. The March 29, 1966 Oil ana Gas Lease is the 
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document which governs the action of both parties and whatever 
damages plaintiffs' are entitled to must be found within the 
provisions of said contract. 
Paragraph 8 of the Oil and Gas Lease provides: 
"Lessee.. .shall pay for damages caused by its operation 
to growing crops on said lands." 
The damage provision is not all inclusive and does not require 
Linirar to pay for all possible damages that Lessor's lands may 
sustain. It has been held that a provision in a lease whereby 
the lessee contracts to pay certain specific damages, including 
those to growing crops, impliedly excludes all damages not so 
expressed. See Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 75 S.W.Pnd 
844 (Missouri, 1934). 
Severance damages were specifically rejected in connection 
with an oil and gas lease in Frankfort Oil Company vs. Abrans, 
Supra. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the surface owners 
damages are limited solely to the surface used and do not include 
depreciation or severance damages to other lands not being uc~d. 
The court held: 
Without a lease provision the rule seems to be that 
absent unreasonable use or statutory provisions or a 
suit brought in tort for negligence, no payment is due 
the surface owner for damages due to exploration or 
drilling. 4 Summers Oil and Gas Section 652 (perm.ed. 
(1962).... Absent a specific lease provision to extend 
liability to cover the indirect loss of value of the 
remaining land, we find that the lease itself was intended 
only to cover loss due to lessee's actual authorized 
operations on the land used. 
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The case of Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Morris, 518 
S.W.2d 444 (Texas, 1975) is somewhat similar to the Frankfort 
case. Morris sued for depreciation of the land permanently 
damaged by Phillips' operations. The damage clause of the lease 
reguired lessee to pay for damages to crops or improvements 
caused by operations of lessee. The trial court awarded Mcrris 
$1,391.00 for depreciation and Phillips Petroleum Company 
appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and held that the 
lessee was not liable for depreciation to the land. 
In order for the Court to grant severance damages to the 
plaintiff, it would have to disregard the holdings of both Flying 
Diamond Corporation vs. Rust and Frankfort Oil Company vs. 
Abrams, and would be in effect re-writing the oil and gas lease 
to add a provision obligating the lessee to pay severance 
damages. 
Plaintiffs have attempted to torture the Court's decision in 
the Flying Diamond case to force it to fit the facts in the case 
at bar. Plaintiffs argued that had Linmar placed the well in the 
southeast corner of plaintiffs' property and provided access 
along the east side, it would have minimized private injury and 
any resulting damages to the remaining property would not have 
been compensable. If the drill site had been located in the 
southeast corner and the road along the east side, it would have 
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resulted in almost total destruction of plaintiffs' orchard and 
it -v/ould have meant that the well site would be directly between 
Altamont town boundary and the land which plaintiff claims he had 
thought about subdividing. If the well site had been built in 
the southeast corner and the road constructed on the East 
boundary, plaintiff would be complaining even mere. Defendant is 
trying to show some alternative location, no matter how 
unreasonable it is. In Flying Diamond the oil company had to pay 
damages to 15 acres of property because the surface owner could 
no longer irrigate the 15 acres because of the roadway. In this 
case, the roadway does not interfere in any way with the 
remaining 15.24 acres. 
Even if severance damage was applicable under the Oil and 
Gas Lease, there has been no credible evidence establishing that 
the 15.24 acres not part of the well site has diminished in 
value. Mr. Smith was receiving $450.00 per year for leasing the 
entire parcel before defendant established the well site and has 
continued to receive $450.00 per year thereafter. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UTILIZED A RESIDUAL VALUE OF 
$375.00 PER ACRE IN COMPUTING DAMAGES. 
Defendant's right to occupy the premises must be construed 
according to the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas Lease. Paragraph 2 
of said Lease provides: 
This lease shall remain in force for a term of 10 years 
and as long thereafter as oil, gas, casing head gasoline, 
or any of them as produced. 
Paragraph 12 of the Oil and Gas Lease provides: 
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If, after the expiration cf primary term of this lease, 
production of the leased premises have ceased from 
any cause, this lease shall not terminate provided 
lessee resumes operations for drilling a well within 
sixty (60) days from such cessation, and this lease 
shall remain in force during the prosecution of such 
operations and, if production results therefrom, 
then as long as production continues. 
The almost exact provision of the Oil and Gas Lease were 
construed by the Court of Appeals in Haby v. Stanolind Oil and 
Gas Company, 228 F.2d 298 (5th Circuit 1955). In that case, the 
lease in question was being held by production in the secondary 
term. The Texas Regulatory Commission issued an order having the 
effect of shutting in all wells in the field in which the lease 
in question was producing. As a result, there was no production 
from the lease for a period of nine months; during this period of 
time the Lessee did nor commence any additional drilling or re-
working operations although the lease contained a cessation of 
production clause providing that "if after discovery of oil or 
gas the production thereof should cease from any cause, this 
lease shall not terminate if lessee commences additional drilling 
or re-working operations within sixty days thereafter". The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
the lease had terminated. The Court stated: 
The parties here provided a savings clause in case 
production ceased from any cause. In such event, tc 
avoid the termination of the lease, the lessee must 
commence additional drilling or reworking operations 
within 60 days thereafter. It was possible for 
Stanolind to comply with the requirement, but it did 
not. The fact that additional drilling was 
economically impracticable is no excuse. . . . The 
lease fixed precisely enough the conditions upon which 
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its continuance depended, and compliance with sucn 
conditions was not excused by the acts of the Railroad 
Commission heretofore described. 
The defendant does not have an unlimited right to occupy the 
7/^ 11 site. Defendant can only occupy the premises for so long as 
oil, gas or casinghead gas is produced or for a period of sixty 
(60) days thereafter providing a new well or reworking operation:: 
are commenced. The reserve reports prepared by defendant's 
independent petroleum engineers estimate the production will 
cease by 1996. At that time, the lease will terminate sixty days 
after the cessation of production, unless Linmar drills another 
well. 
Based on the foregoing facts, not to allow the minimal 
amount residual value awarded would totally disregard the 
testimony presented. If error existed in the Court's decision, 
the error would be in limiting the residual value of the property 
to $375.00 per acre. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY MADE AN ADJUSTMENT OF 
C0MPARA3LES REFERRED TO BY EXPERT WITNESSES RATHER THAN 
ACCEPTING AT FACE VALUE THE OPINION OF ONE OF THE EXPERTS. 
Plaintiffs' counsel argues that the trial court erred in 
taking the two most comparable sales used by the appraisers and 
making adjustments thereto to arrive at the market value of the 
subject property. Plaintiffs' position on this issue is 
absolutely wrong. In 31 Am Jur 2nd, Expert and Opinion 
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Evidence, section 183, the law regarding the conclusiveness or 
controlling effect of expert testimony is summarized as follows: 
There is, generally speaking, no rule of law which 
requires controlling effect or influence to be given to, and 
the court and jury are not required to accept in place of 
their own judgments, the opinion testimony of expert 
witnesses, merely because of the special knowledge of the 
witnesses concerning the matters upon which they give 
their testimony. Expert opinions are not ordinarily 
conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as 
true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally 
regarded as purely advisory in character; the jury may 
place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and 
may reject it, if they find that it is inconsistent with 
the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. The 
weight given to expert testimony is for the trier of the 
facts, who is not required to give it controlling influence. 
Utah Courts have consistently determined that courts 
may give whatever weight they deem appropriate to expert 
testimony. In Nevnneyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1276 (Utah 
1987), the husband challenged the court's determination of the 
fair market value of the family home in arriving at a property 
cettlement in a divorce action. The husband's expert testified 
that the home was worth $122,000.00 and the wife's expert valuad 
the home at $112,000.00. The trial judge fixed a value at 
$117,000,00 and the husband argued it was error for the court to 
"split" the difference between the values fixed by the experts. 
In rejecting this position and holding the trial court did noi: 
aouse its discretion in determining the value of the home, zhe 
court stated: 
...•It is elementary that a judge is not bound to believe 
one witness's testimony to the total exclusion of that 
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of another witness. When acting as the trier of fact, the 
trial judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions 
whatever weight he or she deems appropriate. 746 P.2d at 
1278. 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs' expert valued the property 
at $4,200.00 per acre and defendant's expert valued the property 
at $2,000.00 per acre. This large discrepancy in valuation is 
difficult to understand especially since the experts utilized rhe 
identical comparable sales in arriving at their valuations. As 
indicated in Point IIA above, there was ample reason for the 
Court not to take plaintiffs' expert's valuation at face value. 
While defendant is of the opinion the Court should have accepted 
the 52,000.00 per acre valuation, the Court's method in utilizing 
the sales data presented and making minor adjustments thereto is 
consistent with the Court's function. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED NOT TO 
ALLOW PLAINTIFF PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST. 
The law in Utah regarding pre-judgment interest is set forth 
in Blork vs. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah, 1977). 
The Court held: 
As to the allowance of interest before judgment, this 
Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is clear, 
viz: where the damage is complete and the amount of the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed 
from that time and not from the date of the judgment. On 
the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy, such as in case of 
personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of character, 
false imprisonment, the amount of the damage must be 
ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the 
trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not 
allowed." (Emphasis added). 560 P.2d at 317. 
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Unlike Bjork where pre-judgment interest was awarded because 
the value of the shares of stock and plaintiffs' damages were 
easily calculable and definite, damages in this case cannot be 
calculated with mathematical certainty. Plaintiffs' complaint 
sets forth causes of action for an alleged trespass, taking and 
compensation in eminent domain and excessive or unreasonable use 
of the surface. Defendant's position, consistent with the 
language of the March 29, 1966 Oil and Gas Lease, is that 
plaintiffs are only entitled to damages to the crops on the 
leased premises. With the theories of recovery and the 
appraisals so divergent, it is impossible to calculate with 
mathematical certainty any damage sustained by plaintiffs. 
The cases footnoted in Bjork in support of the above quoted 
statement are utilized by plaintiffs in their Memorandum to 
justify awarding pre-judgment interest. However, an examination 
of these cases show they are clearly distinguishable. In Fell v. 
Union Pacific, 32 Ut.101, 88 P.1003 (1907) the value of sheep 
which died during transit and the amount of weight loss suffered 
by other sheep can easily be ascertained according to fixed ruies 
of evidence and known standards of value. In Jack V. Parsons 
Construction v. State of Utah, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976), 
calculating pre-judgment interest on monies owing under a 
contract was easily determined. Finally, in Uintah Pipeline 
Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976), the court 
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had no trouble allowing pre-judgment interest for the destruction 
of personal property where the cost of rebuilding a compressor 
was subject to computation. 
Assuming arguendo, that the court should determine pre-
judgment interest is applicable, it could only be awarded at 6 
percent rather than the 10 percent requested by plaintiffs. 
Section 15-1-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides: 
Except when parties to a lawful contract agree on a 
specified rate of interest, the legal rate of interest: for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action shall be ten percent per annum. Nothing in this 
section may be construed to in any way affect any penalty 
or interest charge which by law applies to delinquent 
or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before May 14, 1981. (Emphasis added.) 
Section 15-1-1 was amended May 14, 1981, to increase the interest 
rate from six percent to ten percent and change the date at the 
end of the last sentence from 1907 to 1981. After the 1981 
amendment, the section was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court 
in SCM Land Company vs. Watkins and Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah, 
1986). In the SCM Land Company case, defendant, on July 9, 1979, 
executed a renewal lease agreement for office space in the 
Newhouse Office Building. The lease was for three years, ai.d the 
defendant vacated the building prior to the end of its lease. 
The trial court ruled that the defendant had breached the lease 
and a verdict was entered in favor of the plaintiff for lost 
rent, remodeling expenses, and attorney's fees and costs. 
Plaintiff was awarded ten percent prejudgment interest. The 
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Supreme Court affirmed the decision, except as to the award of 
ten percent interest. The Court held that interest should only 
be awarded in the sum of six percent. Plaintiffs attempt to 
distinguish SCM by showing the breach or default occurred prior 
to the change in the statutory interest rate. However, the 
court's decision was based on the date of the lease agreement and 
not the date of default. The Court stated: 
Faber's next point is that the trial court erred in 
allowing statutory interest of ten percent on the 
damages occurring after May 14, 1981, the date the 
statutory rate was changed, because the lease that was 
breached was executed prior to May 14, 1981. Section 
15-1-1 (Supp. 1981) provided: 
The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods, or things in action shall be ten 
percent per annum. But nothing herein contained shall 
be so construed as to in any way affect any penalty or 
interest charged which by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before the 14tb day of May, 1981. 
On this point, Faber is correct, and the judgment 
should be modified to allow six percent interest only, 
the rate in effect prior to May 14, 1981. 732 P.2d 
at 108, 109. 
Since the oil and gas lease was entered into prior to May 
14, 1981, at most, plaintiff would only be entitled to 
prejudgment interest at the rate of six percent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's decision in all respects. 
Tes^y-Aj. Christiansen 
ADKINS & CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERS 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of May, 1989, I 
delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to 
Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs, 225 South 200 East, #150, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
ADDENDUM 
Ruling 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ 
Judgment 
Oil and Gas Lease 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL N. SMITH and DAWNA 
LaVERNE SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant, 
R U L I N G 
Civil No. 8 5-CV-2D 
Having fully considered the evidence received and the closing 
arguments and memoranda of counsel, the court rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on their 
theory of eminent domain, but are entitled to be compensated for 
the damage to crops on the property used by Defendant. 
2. The use to which Defendant has put the property is 
of such ncture and duration that it is rendered unusable to the 
Plaintiffs for agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, the extent of damage to crops amounts to virtually a total 
taking of the property by Defendant. To allow Plaintiffs only 
the minimal value of crops grown on that property for a number of 
years which cannot now be determined would not be equitable. 
3. The value of such a taking can most accurately be 
f-easj-rad by determining the fair market value of the property and 
deducting any residual value tc the landowner after L^fhi^t^zSs 
iu< -^r ,/w -. n 
us-j has enCed and the property resto C" r? J^
T
 oic^ t 
4. Defendant's choice of the well-site was reasonable 
cind practical, and the dealings of Defendant's agents with 
Plaintiffs were carried out in good faith. 
5. There being no evidence that the Defendant's use of 
the property adversely affected the argicultural use of the 
remainder of Plaintiffs1 property, Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
severance damages. 
b. The value of the property at the time the well-site 
was constructed was $3,750.. 00 per acre. The most comparable sales 
used by the appraisers were the Cummings/Rule sale, at $3,530.00 
per acre, and the Wheeler/Stanley sale at $3,300.00 per acre. The 
subject property is closer to a town than the comparables, thus 
justifying a higher value. The property has seme possible residual 
value to Plaintiffs, which the ccurt determines to be $375.00 per 
acre. The court finds that despite good faith effort by Defendant, 
the 1*39 acre parcel has not been restored, and Plaintiffs' damages 
continue. Thus, Plaintiffs are awarded damages as follows: 
4.76 acres 9 $3,375.00 per acre 
(3750 - 375) = $16,065.00 
7. Plaintiffs are net entitled to pre-judgment interest. 
The court has been required to determine the value of the taking 
of real estate for an uncertain period of time, and to fashion an 
equitable award based thereon. Thus, damages cannot be measured 
as of a certain time, or according to certain figures. 
DATED this /)/% day of June, IS88. 
BY THS COURT: 
^ • ^ ^ z ^ ? 
cc: Gordon Am Madse^ 0 
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048 
ROBERT C. GUMMINGS, #777 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL N. SMITH and, ] 
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, ] 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.85-£y>2D 
ATH*"0-
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of the above court, sitting 
without a jury, on the 5th and 6th of April, 1288. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, and 
the defendant was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L. 
Christiansen. The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and the 
defendant having produced evidence, and both sides having rested, 
and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the 
parties, and the Court, being advised, makes and enters the 
following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Plaintiffs are, and during all material times were, 
owners of a twenty-acre tract of land located adjacent to the city 
FILED 
6th C «:-c: Court DdChc:-.e 
State o* Utah 
SEP 1219S8 
-^ •y / i >, i J. , Deputy 
limits of the town of Altamont in Duchesne Counry described as 
follows: 
The East 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 
of Section 25, Township 1 South, Ranqe 4 West, USM. 
2. On or about March 29, 1966, an Gil and Gas Lease 
was entered into bv Hyrum W. Smith and Emily M. Smith, his wife, 
as lessors, and Walter Duncan, as lessee* Plaintiffs, at all 
material times, were successors in interest to said lessors and to 
lessor's interest in said Oil and Gas Lease, and at all material 
times defendant was successor in interest to the lessee's interest 
in and to said Oil and Gas Lease. 
3. During the iron\h of August 1?83 the defendant 
entered upon the aforesaid 20-tract and placed in the southwest 
corner an oil well, an oil well battery and storage tanks. At the 
same time the defendant constructed an access road from the County 
road on the north to che said oil well, oil well battery and 
storage tanks, said road running north and soutn along the west 
boundary of said tract. The oil well, oil well oakery, storage 
tanks and road occupied 4.76 acres of the said 20-acre tract, and 
said 4.76 acres thus occupied by the defendant is hereinafter 
referred to as the "well-site.'1 
4. At the time of the entry by defendant as aforesaid 
the property was being used by plaintiffs for agricultural 
purposes. 
5. The Court finds chat the defendant's choice of said 
well-site was reasonable and practical, and the dealings of 
defendant's agents with plaintiffs were carried out in good faith. 
6. In paragraph 8 of the said lease it is provided 
chat the leasee "shall pay for damage caused by its operations to 
growing crops on said land." The Court finds that the said well-
site had thereon growing crops within the meaning of said lease 
provision at the time of said defendant's entry thereon. The said 
use to which defendant has put the well-site is of such nature and 
duration that it is rendered unusable to plaintiffs for 
agricultural purposes in the foreseeable future, and such damage 
to growing crops and to said land for agricultural purposes 
amounts to virtually a total taking of the property by defendant:, 
and the Court finds that the value of such taking by defendant can 
most accurately be measured by determining the fair market value 
of the well-site and deducting any residual value to the landowner 
after defendant's use has ended and the property restored. 
7. The Court finds that it would be inequitable (and 
contrary to said lease) to allow plaintiffs as damages only the 
minimal value of crops grown on the property for a given number of 
years, which term cannot now be determined. 
8. The Court finds that the fair market value of the 
well-site at the time defendant entered thereon and constructed 
said improvements was $3,750 per acre. The Court finds that the 
most comoarable sales used by the appraisers were the Cummings/ 
Rule sale at $3,530 per acre and the Wheeler/Stanley sale at 
$3,300 per acre. The Court finds that the subject property is 
closer to a town than the comparabies, thus justifying such higher 
value. The Court further finds that the property has some 
possible residual value to plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as 
"residual value"), which the Court finds to be $375 per acre. 
9. The Court finds that defendant took some steps 
toward restoration with regard to 1.39 acres of the said well-
site, but the Court further finds that, despite such good-faith 
effort by defendant, the said tract was not restored, and 
plaintiffs' damages with respect thereto continue. 
10. The Court finds that plaintiffs have been damaged 
in the amount of the difference between the fair market value of 
$3,750 per acre and the residual value to the owner of $375 per 
acre. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs were damaged in 
the amount of $3,375 per acre ($3,750 per acre fair market value 
less $375 per acre residual value) multiplied by 4.76 a:res, 
yielding a total damage to the plaintiffs of $16,065.00. 
11. The Court has been required to determine the value 
of the taking of the well-site for an uncertain period of time, 
and to fashion an equitable award based thereon, and therefore the 
Ccurt finds that damages cannot be measured as of a certain time 
or according to certain figures, and therefore the Court finds 
that plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest. 
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12. The Court finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to 
damages on their theory of eminent domain, but are only entitled 
to be compensated for damage on the property used by defendant for 
its well-site for agricultural purposes as heretofore found by the 
Court. 
13. The Court further determines that there is no 
evidence that the defendant's use of the well-site adversely 
affected the agricultural use of the remainder of plaintiffs1 
property, and finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to severance 
damages. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS Of LAW: 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against 
the defendant in the sum of $16,065 (based upon the virtual 
destruction of the property for agricultural purposes, and that 
the measure of such damages is the difference between the fair 
market value of the well-site at the time of defendant's entry and 
the aforesaid residual value), together with interest thereon at 
the rate of twelve percent per annum from the date hereof. 
2. Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages on any 
eminent domain theory, nor are plaintiffs entitled to severance 
damages. 
3. Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment 
interest. 
-5- i~> 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs. 
DATED the "^ "^  day of ^^72^. 6^1, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
/' r ^C^Z-'f' + *.<£> ? <&•* •<^yy 
DISTRICT JUDGE 1/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to Robert W. Adkins and 
Terry L. Christiansen, attorneys for defendant,. P. 0. Box 660, 
Coalville, Utah 84017, postage prepaid, this / 'S -"'" day of 
August, 1988. 
/ 
. .> <^ . -
Attorney for Plaintiff 
GORDON A. MADSEN, 42048 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #7 77 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
1W 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL N. SMITH and, 
DAWNA LaVERNE SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.85-CV-2D 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, judge of the above court, sitting 
without a jury, on the 5th and 6th of April, 1988. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, and 
the defendants were represented by Robert W. Adkms and Terry L. 
Christiansen. The plaintiffs having produced evidence, and tne 
defendant having produced evidence, and both sides having rested, 
and closing arguments having been presented by memoranda from the 
parties, and the Court, having heretofore entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion of Cordon A. Mad sari .and 
Robert C. Cummings, attorneys for the plaintiffs, ° l'ctCour!Suchecne 
State of uta.l 
JL i - J 
S £ p
 / ^ 1988 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DECREED that 
plaintiffs are hereby awarded judgment against the defendant in 
the sum of $16,065, together with interest thereon at the rate of 
twelve percent per annum from the date hereof, together with costs 
in the amount of $ . 
DATED the ^^> dav of -ydbsS&'StstM, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE J/T~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing prorcsed 
Judcmpnt was mailed to Rcberr W. Adkins and Terry L. Christiansen, 
attorneys for defendant, P. 0. 3ox 660, Coalville, Utah S4017, 
postage prepaid, this Sf day of August, 1988. 
, > - - ^ T C ^ 'y-A 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KSffi-'ac-u, B w OIL AND GAS LEAS? 
THIS AGREEMENT, Entered into this the 2 9 t h _ _ d . y o f March 
_.. H v r u m W . S m i t h a n d E m i l y M . S m i t h , h ^ _ w i f e _ 
R o u t e l r B o x 4 5 B 
C l e a r f i e l d , U t a h 
.hereinafter called lessor 
W a l t e r D u n c a n , P . O . B o x 1 3 7 , D u r a n g o . C o l o r a d o hereinafter caned !•_*« doe. «»».» 
O n e a n d m o r e - - > - - . - « - - - - - - _ 1 . 0 0 <_ m o r e 
1 That leaser, for and in consideration of the sum of w * * w ~ _ Do 'ars if > 
In hand paid and of the covenants and agreements hereinafter contained to be performed b> the lessee has tMs day granted and leased and hereby grants 
leases and lets unto the leasee for the purpose of mining and operating for and producing oil and gas caainghead cas and casinghead gasoline la>ing pipe 
lines building tank*, storing oil building powers stations telephone lines and other struc urea thereon to produce sa\e take rare of and manufacture all of 
D u c h e s n e 
such substanees and for housing and boarding employees the following described tract of land in . • , ,. . w — 
County, JJtQJl •»_-., ____________________________________________-»„ 
T o w n s h i p 1 S o u t h , R a n g e 4 W e s t , U S M ; 
S e c t i o n 2 5 : E J N W j S W J 
.. — •__
 !
 „ 2 0 7 0 0 ' 
in Section , ... Tft>w«mp Range and containing • -»•«« more or less 
a This lease shaii remain la force for a term of ten (10» years and as long thereafter as o.l gas caainghead gas casinghead gasoline or any of them 
is produced 
3 The lessee shall deliver to the credit of the lessor as rovalty free of cost in the p pe I ne to ahich lessee mat connect ts «r is the equal one-eighth 
part Of all oil produced and saved from the leased premises or at the lessees option ma\ pa> to the lessor for such one eighth ro>_lt> the market price for 
oil of like grade and gravity prevailing on the day such oil ts run into the pipe lane or nto storage tsnics 
a The lesaee shall pay lessor as royalty one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of the gas as such for g_s from aells a here gas only is 'ound and 
mhcre not aold shali pay **ifty ifMOQt Dollars per annum as ro>alty from each such aell . i d ahile such ro>al > u *o paid sucn aell wh.il be he d to be a 
fproducing well under paragraph numbered n o hereof The lessor to have gas free of charge from any gas aell on the le»»ed premi«cs for stove* and inside iichta in the principal dwelling house on said land by matting his own connections aith t ie met) the use of said gas to be at the es*or % %o e risk -r d ex 
pense The lessee ahall pay to lessor for gas produced from any oil aell and used b> the lessee for the manufacture of gasol ne or an> other product as roy-
alty one-eighth of the market value of such gas at the mouth of the well If said gas is so d by the lessee then a. rov.lt> one eighth of the proceeds of 
the sale thereof 
ft If operations for the drilling of a well for oil or gas are not commenced on said land on or before one >ear from this date this lease shall terminate 
sws to both parties unieaa the leasee snail on or before one year from this date pay or tender to the lessor or for the lessor s credit in the 
S t a t e S a v i n g s a n d L o a n A s s o c i a t i o n _, „ C l e a r f i e l d , U t a h 
>2 . R a n k _ t . * nr 
_Bank at_ 
Its successors which bank and its successors are the lessor s agent and sha'I continue as the depository of in) and all sums payable under this lea_>e re 
gardless of changes of ownership in said land or In the oil and gas or in the rentals to accrue thereunder the sum »' ««• w e n i y a n Q n Q / 1 U U — • 
2 0 . 0 0 
.Dollars »_2L_L_____ t ahich shall operate a« 
rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling oper-tions for s period of one \ear In like manre- and upon like p-\vme . _. 
tenders the commencement of drilling operations rna> be further deferred for Ike pc-o-< ^cccssn elv Al pmmrnts. or tenders -r-vv be mnCe bv c»~eck or 
draft of lessee or an> assignee thereof mailed or delivered on or before the rental pav r>g da e Not w ithstand ng the death o lie ^or or his succes o 
in interest the pavment or tender of rentals in the manner provided above shall be b id i * on the heirs dev see* executors and ad s i -.ira or* of »u h. per^o-
6 If at i n ) time prior to the discovery of oil or gas on this land and during the te-m of this lease the ie* ee sha I dr 1 a drj hole or I o ~s or t n % and 
this lease shall not terminate provided operations for the drilling of a m ell shall be ccrrrre-ced u tth n tuelv e n omhs frotn t le expirat unof he -v r e .1 pe od 
for which rental has been paid or provided that »ith n said period the leasee begins or rts TICS the j»>me t of entals n the n nncr a-d am^ hf c n above 
provided and In Una e*«.nt the preceding par-graph* hereof governing the pajmert of r a]<> and the manner and effect thereof sh I cor rue n force 
7 In case said lessor owns a less interest in the above described land than the entire and undivided fee simple estate therein then the rovalties and 
rentals herein provided for shall be paid the said lessor only in the proportion mhich his -tereat bears to the »hole aid undivided fee 
, * Th? I*ssee shall have the right to use free of cost gas oil and water found on said and for us operations thereon except water from the aells of the 
lessor when required bv lessor the lessee shall bur> pipe lines below ploa depth and swall p*> for damage caused b\ its operations to c-o* ne crops on 
KM d land No aell shall be drilled nearer than 200 fee- to the house or barn no* on said p etrusc- «, thou -ntten coismt of the lesso- Le-see shal have he 
right o nn> time during or after the exp ation of this lease to remove all machinery f x .res houses but d ncs and o licr structures p -c« c on sa d premises 
luc udini the right to draw and remove all casing 
°^
lt l
*\5 "tate of either partv hereto is assigned <and the privilege of a«-tgnlng in a hole or in part « expressiv alo«ed> the cmenan s hereof «ha I 
extend to tne netrs executors administrators successors and as«tgi s but no change o* exnersh p in the 1 md or in the> rentals o- roval tes sh«ll be o nd ns; 
on the lessee until after notice to the lessee and it has been furnished with the »r ten t an«fer or a«s g mini or a certified copv thi' iof Xn the event thii 
lease shall be assigned as to a part or ai to parts of the above described lands and t ie r- 1er or outer (»f an> such part or parts «h-\ I l i or mite def-u 
in the payment of the proportionate part of the rm due from him or then >uch di au i hell not o rri «. to di' »t or af'cct tMs lease :n »o f vr as i COVCM 
a part or p_rt* of said land upon ahieh the said leasee or anv a*.«igx;«e 1 ereof shall msl r c t- pavment vl snid ren i s If at ai v i me the r he a« man, *s 
four parties entitled to rentals or royalties lessee mav althhold pavmrnts thrrtof unlo s at d un I ail parties dr* cna c in a r t r*. r a rcro antic nstru 
ment to be filed - l ih he lessee a con tron agent to receive all payment* due hereunder »nd to execute d \ sion aid trarsfer orders
 o n bclal ot sad pan es 
and their respective successors in title 
10 Lessor herebv aarran s and agrees to defend the title to the land here n dc>er bed and acrcrs tha the le*«ee ut lt« opt on m v p_\ -ind discharge 
anr tsxes mortgages or other liens existing levied or assessed on or nea nst the abme -eserihid l md^ and n e v i u it exert ses «uci out on it shall be 
suorogated to the rights of »n\ holder or holders the eof and mav reirbursc u*e f b> applv ing to the discharge of anv such mor cage ax or o r lien an> 
rovaltv or rentals accruing hertunder 
_ _ . .
l l
. _ f * o t u , t n s t * n < l t , } e »n>thlng in this lease contained to the contrarv it is exves* v »rrred that if >*s*ce s^a 1 COT ne-ice d-1 Insr IP r- i-ns at an> t me 
ti . e l i«if TK-« *".ll?«« c e «,'i* * • - * • *«• 1 remain in force and Its term sha I con ut so org as -jch o?v-_t ors are p-o«ecutcd and if production r t i j t-
tliere rom then as long as production continues 
t««-}2f~,If,J_U£im.l5L* J J r l r r a r \ t 'J m . o f t n , s l e f t S * production on the "en*ed p-em ves sh » 1 re «e from anv cvuse his lr«se sM 1 not er unate r-ov ded opera 
IV^. i i tm »5_ I 15lC • »«•! *h*" be commenced re ore or on the nex. en« i n< rr I p« ng datr or -rov ded les e Urg ns or re u-nes le p j j n t r af 
" " ? rrifL .'JT*n,r«- fn. »~ou»t »i*re nbefore provided If »f ce the evpirt len of the
 r -sa-^ t e-m of h s ( i « p-od-c an on the leased pret-t se< sha 1 
frf.JT / I _ m A7iT-^?U * , t n , s >•-*» »h-*U not tern iiace provided lessfv r e«un« o-><- it - i fo- i »_ n u e I •» t h t s x v 60 dav$ Com *uch cc a on and tn s 
le-se shall remajn in forct during the p-osecu on of such operation* a id if y-cfuctrn r _ theref-om then as o-w as. produc or cot t nues 
te».e I 3 .n i f _n<> rlri"-1?^-? Tel'*'* **"£l h»-eafter be oaned in severalty or n sew -raic tracts he p-erris.es re er l e i « s »n be develoxd and o erated a« o«e 
InVe !>»• -eiI.-^.>V-«_^ K r u m B h * r * u n-" p * n n " b * treated as an ent re v «u _ hal be d ided arrong and p-id to su«.h -ep irate u« ' s in the p-oport on 
on %rLae ifl fr.^.v *JJ« _V, _*c!? *Ven_ s c ^ - r u t ^ «»n f r be»-% to the entire 1--*. d acrcnge T"ere s» all he no oil nation em the p_rt of the leasee o ol'set acl s 
r°ee»vPf,- , . » d t. °_»f»»ch the land covered bj. this lease ma> be herea' er div ded bv ale devise or oil era se or to furnish *epan «• me««urin« or 
"
 c
„ _ " •
 l
*f"_".
 I
*„i*, „„re,b> ****** x*Rt„ , l n ,*"•" e\ct\i thii le_se shal bv a««tg-<d a c J. pnr or _s to part' of the al>ov e ocsenoeu t nd and 1c heder 
?h-?i nne oLrJW ?« f?. fP."rl o r ?*"* ,\txml\ tnxl or m a k e d« f*ult in the pavrrent of He i rcpor lonate part of the rent due from him or then «jcn de auit 
iTJk- i « . ,n.»^«,««, «? .V ° affect tin* leas, in so far as it covers a part or parts n' . d _nd inon *hirh the sn d lessee or anv a«s gr ei -ereof shal 
fe«. _i?J unti _Ti?«,_*«,_» Mi_re„i*l* " a l a n > , l m e i n e r e D * a s m a n > »* f o u r p a r l c " r n e d ° r ' l - * o«" r°*a tie« lessee n av «• , I hold p» nrr s thereof un 
iifd to •«nr„f*^rf.?»o«o _^ t3f ? n t t t e , , n »"t>n* in a recordable instrument to be filed •» tl he essee a corriron agent to r« ceivr all p_> mems d-c hereunder 
and to execute ttixuton and transfer orders on behalf of said parties and their rtspee ivc successors in title 
tt>*rlZr JO'YMS i^__r*KArnht. l i m * * n d f r o m llm* i 0 Vm? surrender this lri*e as to anv par o par s of he ta.cd premises b> de.ivcrln? or ma ng a release mereof to the lesaor or bv placing a release iiereof of record in tne proper count) 
15 This lease and al. its terms conditions and stipulations shall extend to and be t rd ng on al' success©-* of said lessor o- lessee 
ollea covenant »tth%rVLVl i f l ° i«~^ , f"T l n . \ l e d «n mhole or In part nor «hall lessee be h id ^bie in damages for 'allure to con plv with th* express or tm-
r i u i f n n i » !t thi •lfeje°7f_ ,*r e' , h e r « * , t h »* » r * v e n t e < 1 b> o r lt * u c n f«* « " *• ' " * result of any Fedtral or S t a c a >* s xecu L orde-s rule, or 
b 7 ^ r - ?- of i,i» o , h . . i , " . . h ' - P / 1 i r , n l e r m h c r e o r . s u c n term has not been ex end-d -v produc Ion or dr ng as n this u - prov dirt . rd lessee 
he eo? hi be eitended £ , . . ' , « n d causes is unable to drill a mell on the lei*ed p-e ses 'or oil o- g*s the p r n t r t e - - % d »e rental proi son 
aselawne eau» DurfnS _«l° ,^*i il!.1,>. J"OIV »e*r «lw >ear until the first annuersarv h e_ ucc-rnng ninet> «0 or moredavs «, J! i»« the r - o w l of such 
#IZ**\*V££ ltSU£:Z ISlll'Z^xn*? tl*"t!rc: -1Sfbf«.e? P f 0 < 1 U C e ' ^ ° r m m ™ * n % P r ° d J C l S r r o m l h « X"*«« P"«»*« *»» r . _ s 0 0 c« . r of he above 
i^Vrfelit»» U K . f , ! " ? t n * r i * n a t l t s *»^llon »* »n> t l m * »n e l from time to time to pool or unitize all or anv p t*i or part* o' t-e above dr 
to be ir»o units no. exceeding the m i imum stre t *c on «h ch 
or unitization provided hoaever that sucii units ma) exceed 
«hip subdivisions or lease lire* Lcs—c sha 1 exere se 
„ f l h ; r t ,*: rt \» , e!,i,Irri * - e n °*Uon a t «  «* — • - " - ^  irn 
_ _^Td .IT, \ * Jl,XV«'r J V i a , l e * " * o r '*••**« «» the immediate vicinity thereof such paollr? 
fuen J- «^ m Tm 2[",!?. u J?/r.,J?%* r u i e i o r ^-wl-tiong in force at the time of such poo rg 
!-f,T /^,?«m i m . b * L10lJnJ?r* t h % f t t r n • c r " »f "^ *cn excess is necessary tn order to conforr- t 
XN WITNESS THEREOF a* sign the da> and > ear first above arltten 
— _ y/^/? ,J7 ~V1~' ^f-'TV-'l/Cj/ 
i S B U M W . S M I T H 
— _ / / l v v i . A \ , V ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ \ v \ v Jdci.. 
— — E M T T . V -\<r C;TVTTT-R 
STATE OF-
COUNTY O F . 
U T A H 
<&Si s> 
• } . . . ACKNOWLEPGMKNT FOR INDIVIDUAL (Kans.. Okla.. and Colo.) 
Before me, the umlersigncd. a Notary Public0 within and for *uid county and state, on thi.<«_ 
J a y „, S.,.-. / in 6 6 personally .ppe.rcd Hyrum W. Smith 
E m i l v M. S m i t h , h i s w i f e 
personally known to be the identical person^Lwho executed the within ami foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me 
t h e y ..executed the same as. t h e i r -free and voluntary act and deed for the use.* and purpose? therein act forth. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and officj>l-s*al the day and yepjMast aUove^w^ittcja* ^ 
Mr co-n^on expire 9>A /< ? ^g. ^^^^^^^f^^r^^ 
Notary rubhe. •<* 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF-
"> ss. ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL < Kans^Okla.. an3 Colo.) 
Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, within and for said county and state, on this-
day ~f 1Q , personally appeared 
mr
"^ 
to me personally known to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me 
.hat- _executed the same a s . Jfree and voluntary act and deed for the uses* and purposes therein set forth. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal the day and year last above written. 
My commission «**ptr»« 
Notary Public. 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF-
On thi.«„ _day of— 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR CORPORATION 
„. A. D., 10 . before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public 
n and for the county and state aforesaid, personally appeared— -___«___—_-____-____--___»_= , 
:o me personally known to be the identical person who signed the name of the maker thereof to the within and foregoing 
nstrument as its- -President and acknowledged to me that- .executed the same as- -free and 
voluntary act and deed, and as the free and voluntary act and deed of said corporation, for the uses and purposes therein set forth. 
Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written. 
I^y commission *»*piri»« 
Notary Public. 
3 
S 
i J. 
'J 
"J 
>J >j 
^ 
: * s> 'U 
* J ^ Si 
S » -s ^  •£.. J 
- i ^  1 c ^ 
1
 15 = •£ 
NOTE: When signature by mark in Kansas. !«aid mark to bo \\itnv«"*«*<l bv at lea.-t one person and al^o acknowledged. 
For acknowledgment by mark, UM legular Kansas acknowledgment. 
1TATK OF 
OUNTY OF_ "> >-. ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL (K.nnv, Okla.. and Colo.) 
Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, within and for «.unl county and xtutc. on thi*_ 
»y of—— 1 .——. V.* personally appeared 
n d _ _ -
a me personally known to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument xnd acknowledged to mc 
1t t t
 nc~wTT V v«gSXw ffv p yrty *["£ ^JL'Z ; freV an^ v o , 1 u n; a r>' n c l » n < * ^ l f«r the use- and purposes therein set forth. 
UN \* IT*NK.SS W HKRKOF, I have hereunto set my hand and offu ial >eal the .lay and year !a-t al.o\e written. 
ly mmmi.Hsinn expires 
Nv..tai y Public. 
